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•  Abstract 
 
 
Program administrators are often faced with the difficult problem of allocating scarce resources 
among regions in a country when interventions are aimed at addressing multiple objectives.  
One main concern is the tradeoff between poverty reduction and improvement of 
environmental quality. To provide a framework for analysis, this paper develops a model of 
optimal budget allocation that allows for variations in three factors: administrators' valuation of 
objectives; their willingness to accept tradeoffs among objectives and regional allotments; and 
regional administrative costs. The results from an application of this model using information 
for Lao PDR show that simple poverty indicators alone do not provide consistent guidelines for 
policy. However, when different poverty indicators are embedded in an optimizing model that 
incorporates preferences and costs, the resulting provincial allocations are very similar. This 
suggests that adoption of a formal analytical approach to resource allocation can help promote 
the harmonization of regional policy guidelines.   2
1.  Introduction 
 
The lower Mekong sub-region, consisting of Cambodia, Lao PDR and Vietnam, is one 
of the poorest areas in Asia.  With per-capita GDP’s in the range $US 270-410, and poverty 
incidence rates of 35-40 percent, these three countries are experiencing serious natural resource 
degradation in rural areas and declining environmental quality in major cities.  To improve its 
understanding of links between poverty and environmental degradation in the sub-region, the 
World Bank has undertaken a Poverty-Environment Nexus (PEN) study with a two-phase 
implementation.
1  The Phase I report, completed in October, 2002, provided numerous insights 
into the spatial relationships between environmental problem indicators and poverty in the 
three countries (Dasgupta, et al., 2003).  A preliminary Phase II analysis has provided further 
understanding of spatial poverty-environment linkages, with a particular focus on the burden 
imposed on the poor by environmental degradation. 
Concurrently with the World Bank PEN initiative, Cambodia, Lao PDR and Vietnam 
have begun to focus on poverty-environment linkages as they develop poverty reduction and 
growth strategies.  In Lao PDR, the focal country for this paper, the PEN Phase I report has 
served as an input to the National Poverty Eradication Program (NPEP).  While the NPEP 
addresses overall sectoral and macro policy issues, it also targets 46 priority districts for 
poverty eradication.  The government has identified these districts using a comprehensive 
measure of poverty, as well as consideration for regional and provincial representation.
2  Yet to 
be determined, however, are the overall resource requirements for the priority districts, the 
allocation of resources across and within these districts, the magnitudes of central and local  
                                                           
1  See “The Poverty-Environment Nexus: A Strategic Approach for Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Vietnam,” (World 
Bank) 
2  The poverty measure includes consumption and asset indicators, and access to basic services and infrastructure.   3
government contributions, and relative sector priorities.   
These problems typify work on the poverty-environment nexus, which is complicated by 
uncertainty over appropriate rules for the allocation of program budgets.  Within countries, 
program administrators often use indicators such as poverty incidence to assign regional 
priorities.  This approach provides equal budgetary allotments for all poor households if they 
are uniformly distributed across regions.  However, recent poverty-mapping studies in Asia, 
Africa and Latin America have shown that this is often far from the case (Simler and Nhate, 
2002; Dasgupta, et al., 2003; Lanjouw, et al., 1998).  Even if budgetary allotments are equal, 
resource-constrained program planners have to confront difficult tradeoffs among multiple 
objectives:  the number and proportion of poor households actually served; the average quality 
of services; and the associated degree of improvement in environmental quality.   
The allocation problem may be compounded by regional differences in administrative 
costs.  In this paper, we consider three spatial factors that affect these costs.  The first is the 
settlement density of poor households.  For program administrators and technical assistance 
workers, average transport times and costs are significantly lower in densely-populated areas.  
Such areas also benefit from scale economies in projects that improve community-level 
services (e.g., sanitation or access to safe water).  The second spatial factor is poverty 
incidence.  Areas with high poverty incidence have relatively low screening costs, because 
they have lower risks of benefits "leakage" to higher-income households.  The third factor is 
overall population density, which affects monitoring and enforcement costs for natural 
resource conservation and pollution management programs. 
How should poverty-environment programs accommodate these diverse concerns, and 
what are the implications for the use of priority indicators such as poverty incidence or the rate   4
of natural resource degradation?  To provide a framework for analysis, this paper develops a 
model of optimal budget allocation that allows for variations in three factors:  administrators' 
valuation of objectives; their willingness to accept tradeoffs among objectives and regional 
allotments; and regional administrative costs.  We explore the model's implications using 
provincial data from Lao PDR.  Our results suggest that under real-world conditions, single 
indicators of poverty or environmental degradation may provide very poor guidance for 
allocating program resources.  In many cases, priorities suggested by the indicator-based 
approach have large, negative correlations with priorities suggested by a more complete 
optimizing model.  In light of these results, we believe that regional poverty-environment 
strategies should incorporate information on administrators' preferences and costs, as well as 
indicators of poverty and environmental damage.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we use alternative 
poverty indicators to establish priorities for program budget allocation in Lao PDR.  
Unfortunately, we find that different indicators suggest very different priorities.  In Section 3, 
we broaden the analysis with an optimizing model that incorporates administrators' preferences 
and administrative costs.  We show that the indicators-guided approach reflects highly-
restrictive assumptions about the parameters of the model.  Using Laotian data, we relax these 
assumptions in Sections 4 and 5, and explore the consequences for regional allocation.  Section 
6 provides a summary, conclusions, and suggestions for future research.    5
2.  Regional Allocation Using Poverty Indicators 
Among priority indicators, the two most common are probably poverty incidence (poor 
people / total population) and the poverty count (total poor people).  Some program strategies 
limit activities to regions whose indicator values exceed arbitrarily-specified thresholds.  More 
generally, budgetary allocations are guided by relative indicator values.  Following the latter 
approach for Lao PDR, we compute regional budget shares that are proportional to the values 
of poverty incidence and the poverty count.  Figures 2.1 - 2.3 display the results, and Table 2.1 
indicates the associated priority rankings.  Figure 2.1 and Table 2.1 present provincial shares 
on an approximate north-south axis, while Figures 2.2 and 2.3 display relative shares on a 
provincial map.  The figures show that changing the indicator has a significant impact on 
provincial shares and priority rankings.  Among provinces with top-five shares for poverty 
incidence, only two in the north (Huaphanh, Oudomxay) are in the top-five group for the 
poverty count.  Changing the indicator from incidence to count shifts two provinces 
(Xaysomboon, Sekong) from the highest to the lowest group.  Conversely, Savannakhet moves 
from the lowest to the highest group.  Overall, the correlation result in Table 2.2 (ρ = .006) 
suggests that the two sets of provincial shares have effectively zero association:  Allocation by 
one indicator creates a random result for the other.  
Our conclusions are not changed when we include two measures related to the poverty 
gap.
3   First, we estimate a province's total poverty gap by summing across poverty gaps for all 
individuals who are estimated to fall below the poverty line.  Second, we estimate provinces' 
poverty severity by squaring individual gaps before summing them.  Poverty severity draws  
                                                           
3 The individual poverty gap is the difference between the poverty line and the actual income of a poor individual.   6
attention to provinces with large numbers of people whose incomes fall far short of the poverty 
line. 
Either measure can be used to determine provincial shares, and Table 2.2 displays the 
results.  The two measures are highly correlated with each other (ρ = .95); strongly correlated 
with the poverty count (.96 and .88, respectively); and weakly correlated with poverty 
incidence (.20 and .38).  While the poverty gap and poverty severity add interesting 
dimensions to the discussion, their introduction does not seem to alter our basic results.  Either 
measure could substitute for the poverty count, but neither is highly correlated with poverty 
incidence.  We conclude that alternative poverty indicators provide contradictory guidance for 
regional resource allocation in Lao PDR. 
3.  Regional Program Planning 
 
To provide a more consistent framework, we adopt an approach to optimal regional 
allocation that resembles an intrafamilial allocation model developed by Behrman, Pollak and 
Taubman (1982).  In this model, parents face the problem of allocating educational resources 
to children with different innate abilities.  Since the children's earnings will depend on their 
schooling as well as their genetic endowments, the parents' allocation of educational 
investments will affect both the overall level and the distribution of the children's future 
earnings.  The model formalizes the parents' choice as constrained maximization of a CES 
welfare function, whose arguments are the children's future earnings.  Constraints include an 
earnings equation (a function of schooling and genetic endowment) and a fixed budget.  Given 
these constraints, the parents' allocation is determined by their degree of aversion to inequality 
in their children's earnings (summarized in the CES substitution parameter) and by any 
exogenously-determined factors that imply differential preferences among children (the   7
distribution parameters).  Our interregional allocation model adopts essentially the same 
approach, for provinces instead of children. 
3.1  Regional Welfare Function 
Within each province, implementation of a poverty-environment program involves 
pursuit of four objectives: the number of poor people served by the program (weighted by their 
relative poverty); the proportion of poor people who are served; the quality of services 
(determined by program expenditure net of administrative costs); and the environmental 
improvement realized by the program.  Formally, we specify a CES welfare function as 
follows: 
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where  Ei  =  Program expenditure (net of administrative costs) in region i 
 S i =  Poor people served by the program in region i 
 P i =  Poverty count in region i 
 g i =  Average poverty gap in region i 
 N i =  Natural resource, environmental (or other) improvement in region i 
 
In this formulation, the distribution parameters (β1 - β4) indicate relative preferences for 
the four objectives.  The parameter γ determines the elasticity of substitution, or willingness to 
accept tradeoffs among objectives.  Particularly interesting values for γ are 1 (associated with 
an infinitely-elastic, or linear, welfare function); 0 (a unit-elastic, or Cobb-Douglas, function) 
and -∞ (a zero-elasticity, or Leontief, function).  The linear case is not subject to diminishing 
returns, so an optimal linear solution can include zero values for some program objectives.  
Conversely, the Leontief case prescribes a fixed ratio of outcomes.  The Cobb-Douglas case is 
intermediate, with moderately-diminishing returns and an implicit requirement that all 
objectives have non-zero values in the optimal solution.    8
3.2 Regional Administrative Cost Functions 
We specify spatial administrative cost functions for two components of the program.  For 
the component related to poverty and household-level pollution, we incorporate the effects of 
poverty density (the settlement density of poor households) and poverty incidence.  We posit 
that the average cost of serving a poor household in a particular region is negatively related to 
the region's poverty density, for two reasons.  The first involves transport costs, which are 
significant because programs often require recurrent support from administrative and technical 
staff.  Examples include monitoring and enforcement of regulations related to pollution, 
cultivation of fragile lands, and forest-clearing; and technical assistance to pesticide users, 
sanitation projects, and programs that reduce indoor air pollution through changes in 
ventilation, fuel use, and facilities for cooking and heating.  For regional administrative staff, 
the cost of travel to communities served depends on both road quality and distance from the 
administrative center.  Characteristic distance traveled is, in turn, a function of the area 
administered.  We use a region's poverty density to capture this spatial cost factor.  A second, 
related element reflects program scale economies in densely-settled areas.  Examples include 
community-level sanitation and clean-water projects that require interconnections among 
households, as well as technical assistance programs whose teaching and outreach components 
can address groups rather than individuals.   
  We also posit that a region's average administrative cost is negatively related to its 
poverty incidence.  In mixed-income areas, program benefits intended for the poor may "leak" 
to higher-income groups in the absence of costly screening.  Leakage may be particularly 
serious in community-level programs that address collective problems such as sanitation, water   9
quality, reforestation and erosion control.  Since screening is much easier in areas populated 
mostly by poor people, we use poverty incidence to capture the screening cost factor. 
  The following function incorporates the effect of poverty density and incidence on 
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where  csi  =  Administrative cost per person served in region i 
 D i  =  Poverty density (Poverty count / Area) in region i 
 I i  =  Poverty incidence (Poverty count / Total population) in region i 
 
  We also incorporate a spatial cost function for environmental program components that 
involve natural resource conservation (forests, fisheries, soils) and management of extra-
household pollution (outdoor air pollution, agricultural pollution, etc.).  Environmental 
improvement in such cases usually requires monitoring and enforcement of regulations.  
Increased settlement density means greater pressure on environmental resources from more 
sources, which in turn implies higher monitoring and enforcement costs to attain the same level 
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where cni  =  Unit cost of environmental improvement in region i 
 T i  =  Population density in region i   
             
3.3  Regional Budget Constraint 
 
After regional allocation of the national program budget, each region has the following 
budget constraint: 
(4)   i ni i si i i N c S c E R + + =    10
3.4  Optimal Allocation Across Program Objectives 
 
For each region, program administrators must solve the following Lagrangian problem to 
determine the optimal allocation: 
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First-order conditions are as follows:  
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The following equations determine optimal levels of net expenditure (E
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Substitution back into the welfare function from (14) leads to an expression for optimal 
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3.5  Optimal Allocation Across Regions 
Following Behrman, et al. (1982), we formalize the interregional allocation problem as 
constrained maximization of a CES welfare function that incorporates two factors:  the degree 
of aversion to inequality in regional allocation, and exogenously-determined preference 
weights assigned to regions.  The latter could be equal, or they could differentiate regions by 
poverty incidence, poverty count, or other political, social or environmental factors that are 
assigned importance by administrators.  We specify the relevant welfare function and budget 
constraint as follows: 
   12
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where ηi = exogenous preference weight for region i. 
The national optimization problem is defined by the following Lagrangian: 
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3.6  Implications:  Substitution Parameters 
We begin exploring the implications of the model by considering solutions for equation 
(20) in three basic substitution scenarios: linear, Cobb-Douglas and Leontief.  In the following 
discussion, we refer to γ and δ as the regional and national substitution parameters,   13
respectively.  For a Cobb-Douglas regional welfare function, γ = 0 and regional budget shares 
in equation (20) are strictly proportional to regional η-values, whatever the value of  δ.  From 
equation (15), each region has an identical ∆-value (equal to one in our case, since we assume 
that the distribution parameters (β1 ... β4) sum to one).  With the ∆i's and the exponents of the 
ηi's all equal to one, each region's budget share in equation (20) is the ratio of it's η-value to the 
sum of regional η-values.  As (20) shows, the result also holds when the national substitution 
parameter (δ) is equal to zero, regardless of the value  of γ, since each region's budget share 
again becomes the ratio of its η-value to the sum of regional η-values.   
The intuition behind these results is straightforward.  In the Cobb-Douglas case, budget 
shares for the four objectives are equal to their distribution parameters (the βi's), which do not 
change across regions.  Since the implicit demand functions for these objectives are unit- 
elastic, interregional differences in administrative costs induce exactly-compensating changes 
in demand, and expenditures for each objective remain the same.  Constant budget shares 
across objectives also make ∆ and Π constant across regions, implying that a dollar spent in 
any region provides the same welfare increase.  For this basic reason, the Cobb-Douglas 
assumption at either regional or national levels ensures that relative shares will be affected only 
by the exogenously-specified regional distribution weights (ηi). 
Now we consider the linear case, in which γ = 1, δ → 1 , and the regional welfare 
function is purely additive: 
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In the optimal solution that incorporates equation (1a), administrators' choices take no account 
of balance among objectives or distribution across regions.  The implication is clear after we 





























As δ → 1, the parameters of (20a) approach infinity, and the budget is allocated to a few 
regions with the highest products ηi∆i, even if their numerical advantage is very slight.  Within 
each region, by the same logic, the budget is allocated to the highest-value objective (Ei, Si or 
Ni), even if its numerical advantage is very slight. 
Finally, we consider the Leontief case (γ → -∞ ; δ → -∞).  The effect of movement 
toward zero substitution elasticity is most easily seen through its impact on the Θ's (equations 
10 and 12) and the ω's (equation 20).  As γ → -∞, the exponents [1/(γ-1)] for ΘN and ΘS 
approach zero.  This ensures little response to changes in relative β-values, so relative 
attainment levels for the four program objectives remain nearly constant.  For regional shares 
in equation (20), as γ → -∞ and δ → -∞, responsiveness declines as the exponents of η and ∆ 
both approach zero.   
3.7  Implications:  Other Parameters 
The other basic elements of the model are the regional distribution parameters (relative 
preferences for program objectives); national distribution parameters (relative preferences for 
different regions); and administrative cost elasticities.  The impact of these parameters on 
outcomes increases as the regional and national substitution parameters move toward one.  The 
cost function parameters warrant particular attention here, since they are generally neglected in   15
priority-setting exercises.  As cost elasticities increase, affecting regional unit costs of 
administration (csi , cni), the effects propagate across objectives (through ΘS and ΘN) and 
regions (through the effects of ΘS and ΘN on ∆).  In principle, for a "perverse" cost case, the 
result could be reversal of the provincial rank-ordering suggested by a budget shares analysis 
that ignores administrative costs. 
 
4.  An Application to Lao PDR: Cobb-Douglas Results 
In Section 2, we have computed alternative provincial budget shares using relative 
measures of poverty incidence, the poverty count, and the poverty gap.  Our discussion in 
Section 3.6 shows that this is equivalent to the use of poverty indicators as η-values in the 
optimal allocation model under Cobb-Douglas assumptions (γ = 0, δ = 0, or both).  In this 
restricted case, provincial budget shares depend only on the η-values, and are not affected by 
variations in welfare function weights and cost elasticities.  However, the levels and 
distributions of activities within provinces are strongly affected by such variations.  Using 
provincial poverty incidence as the η-variable, we illustrate these effects with two examples:  
the impact of changes in regional welfare function weights (the β's in equation (1)) on the 
number of poor people served, program quality (proxied by expenditure net of administrative 
costs), and environmental improvement; and the impact of changes in the administrative cost 
elasticity on the number of poor people served. 
In the first example, we assume that administrative cost elasticities are zero and focus on 
provincial outcomes when parameters change for the four variables in the regional welfare 
equation:  expenditure (Ei), poor people served (Si), the proportion of poor people served (Si / 
Pi), and environmental improvement (Ni).  In four cases, we assign a weight of .70 to each 
objective and equal weights to the others.  In the fifth case, we assign equal weights to all   16
objectives.  Figure 4.1 displays the results for Si, Ei and Ni in the five cases.
4  Values are 
normalized to 100 for the case of equal utility weights.  Under the Cobb-Douglas assumption, 
the provincial budget share for each objective is equal to its utility weight and (with constant 
administrative costs in this case), the proportional impact of changing utility weights is the 
same across provinces.  Because of this equi-proportional impact, the results in Figure 4.1 are 
the same for each province.  We use the equal-weights case as the baseline (all three objectives 
equal 100).  When poor persons served is the primary objective, S increases by 62%, while E 
falls by 56% and N decreases by 69%.  Assignment of primacy to S/P has a similar effect, 
although E drops somewhat more and N somewhat less.  When program expenditure (our 
measure of quality) is the primary objective, S and N drop by 62% and 56%, respectively, 
while E increases by 181%.  When environmental improvement is the primary objective, S and 
E decrease by 62% and 56%, while N increases by 181%. 
In the second example, we maintain equal utility weights for the four regional objectives 
and allow the administrative cost elasticities to vary from 0 to -0.9.
5  Table 4.1 indicates 
changes in poor persons served for changes in α1 (cost elasticity for poverty density) and α2 
(cost elasticity for poverty incidence).
6  When the α's change from 0 to -0.9, population served 
falls to 26% of its constant-cost level in Xayabouri and Borikhamxay, and rises to 2.53 times 
its constant-cost level in Huaphanh and Oudomxay.  The provincial rankings in Table 4.2 
suggest that the southern provinces are most affected by cost considerations, while the northern 
                                                           
4  S, E and N are determined by equations (9) – (14). 
5  When the regional welfare function is Cobb-Douglas, the proportional impact of cost elasticity changes is the 
same, regardless of the weights assigned to utility function objectives.  For the experiments reported in this paper, 
we use arbitrary scaling values for α0 and φ0 in the cost equations.  Relative results for program objectives and 
regional allocations are invariant to the choice of these scaling values. 
6  These two parameters are in the administrative cost equation (2).   17
provinces are least affected.  Figure 4.2 indicates the overall pattern of impact on provincial 
rankings. 
Table 4.3 presents equivalent results for environmental improvement, while Figure 4.3 
provides graphical evidence on the magnitude of the changes.  In Table 4.3, changing from 
constant to highly-elastic implementation cost has impacts ranging from a reduction of 
environmental improvement to 15% of its former level in Vientiane Municipality, to an 
increase to 2.15 times its former level in Sekong.  Again, the changes in provincial rankings 
seem greatest in the southern provinces.  Figure 4.3 indicates that rank changes are most 
pronounced for provinces with the highest levels of environmental improvement in the 
constant-cost case. 
In equation (3), we specify a general function that relates the unit cost of environmental 
improvement to population density.  However, we recognize that particular environmental 
problems may warrant a different treatment of the population/environment relationship.  Rural 
problems related to deforestation and soil degradation may provide a good example in Lao 
PDR.  For problems in this class, a more appropriate population density measure for 
environmental protection costs may be rural population per unit of flat land.  Areas with high 
flat-land population density may experience more intensive pressure to cultivate steeply-
sloped, forested areas.  The result may be shorter fallow periods for shifting cultivators, and 
additional pressure to clear forested areas as yields fall.  Under these circumstances, 
environmental protection costs may be higher (and benefits lower) than the use of general 
population density would predict. 
In Table 4.4, we illustrate the potential policy consequences by introducing flat-land 
population density into the unit cost equation (3) for environmental protection.  For the   18
comparison, we use the Cobb-Douglas assumptions (γ = 0, δ = 0) and high administrative cost 
elasticities (α1 = α1 =-.9).  Provincial populations served (S) are invariant to the change of 
density measure.  For general population density, we include the environmental improvement 
(N) result from Table 4.3 in column 4 of Table 4.4.  The result associated with the change to 
flat-land density is in column 5.  With relatively high flat-land densities and high protection 
costs, the northern provinces exhibit a sharp fall in environmental improvements realized with 
the available budget.  In contrast, lower unit costs in the Center and South produce 
significantly higher levels of environmental improvement in many provinces.  Vientiane 
Municipality exhibits the highest percent environmental improvement (although both levels are 
relatively small), because its flat-land population density is much closer to the norm for other 
provinces than its general density.  
 
5.  CES Results 
 
Moving to the CES case allows more scope for administrative discretion and a broader 
range of results.  At the regional level, the CES substitution parameter (γ) indicates the degree 
to which administrators are willing to accept tradeoffs among objectives.  As γ approaches its 
limiting values (-∞ and 1), the administrators' willingness moves from zero (fixed ratios for 
objectives, regardless of relative costs) to infinity (willingness to accept zero outcomes for two 
of the three objectives (S, E, N), if focusing on the third will maximize total welfare).
7  At the 
national level, the substitution parameter (δ) indicates the administrators' relative aversion to 
differences in provincial budgetary allocations.  As δ approaches its limiting values (-∞ and 1), 
the administrators' aversion to unequal allocations moves from very strong to zero.     19
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 provide evidence on the impact of changes in the two substitution 
parameters.  Again, we present provinces in approximate geographical alignment, with 
Phongsaly in the extreme north and Attapeu in the extreme south.
 8  Figure 5.1 displays 
changes in optimal budget shares for different combinations of γ and δ, under the assumption 
of constant administrative costs and equal weights for the four regional objectives (E, S, S/P, 
N).  In the baseline, or Cobb-Douglas, case (γ = 0, δ = 0), provincial shares are proportional to 
provincial poverty incidence, which enters via the η-values in the national welfare equation 
(16).  In the next column, the substitution parameters are given low and high values, 
respectively (γ = -9, δ = 0.9).  These values correspond to a low willingness to substitute 
among the four program objectives, and a high willingness to substitute among provinces in 
pursuit of the greatest total welfare.  The results are not markedly different from the Cobb-
Douglas results, since low substitutability among objectives makes local allocations 
unresponsive to differences in local conditions (except for the exogenous η-values -- the 
poverty incidence estimates, in this case).  Two notable exceptions in the center-south, 
Savannakhet and Champasack, gain significantly, while budget shares fall for Xaysomboon 
and Sekong in the same general area.  Overall allocations across the north, center and south 
appear little-affected.   
Column 3 shows that optimal provincial shares become strikingly different when 
administrators' willingness to substitute among objectives is high, but willingness to substitute 
among provinces is low.  The result (again, for constant administrative costs and equal weights 
on the four objectives) is a nearly flat distribution:  All provincial shares lie between 4.6% and 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
7  We use limiting values to simplify the discussion, but we recognize the common-sense restriction that would 
keep administrators from choosing the pairs (E>0, S=0) or (S>0, E=0) in practice.  In our examples, we restrict γ 
and δ to the range (-9, 0.9). 
8  See Figure 2.2 for a map of Laotian provinces.   20
6.0%.  At the same time, optimal solutions within provinces look very different.  For the case 
of constant administrative cost, Table 5.1a displays the changes in numbers of poor people 
served (S) and levels of environmental improvement (N) in the shift from column 1 to column 
3 of Figure 5.1.  The shift produces changes in S in the range ± 100%.  For N, positive changes 
of several hundred percent are not unusual.  Table 5.1b introduces high administrative cost 
elasticities, with even more striking results.  Because the regional welfare function is nearly 
linear for γ = 0.9, near-complete substitution among objectives is possible.  The result in the 
welfare-maximizing solution is a reduction to near-zero solutions for S and N in some cases, 
and very large increases in others.  
While column 3 of Figure 5.1 portrays a nearly-uniform allocation, column 4 moves to 
the opposite extreme.  It corresponds to the case (γ = 0.9, δ = 0.9): very high willingness to 
substitute across both objectives and regions.  Since diminishing returns are nearly eliminated 
in this case, almost all resources shift to two provinces -- Oudomxay and Huaphanh, both in 
the north -- that promise to yield the highest total gain in welfare.   
Figure 5.2 changes the scenario by introducing highly-elastic administrative costs.  The 
result is a net shift toward the central region in column 2, an even more pronounced shift 
toward the this region in column 3 (in contrast to the nearly-uniform allocation in Figure 5.1) 
but even more focus on Oudomxay and Huaphanh in column 4.   
Figure 5.3 provides evidence on the role of relative provincial costs in the high-elasticity 
case.  For service delivery to the poor, unit costs around 10 in Oudomxay and Huaphanh 
contrast with costs around 95 in Xayabouri and Borikhamxay.  For environmental 
improvement, the cost disadvantage of Vientiane Municipality is particularly striking.  The   21
service delivery cost advantage of Oudomxay and Huaphanh provides one important reason 
why optimal budget allocations focus on these two provinces when both γ and δ are high. 
 
6.  Summary and Conclusions 
We began our illustration for Lao PDR by setting both substitution parameters at Cobb-
Douglas values (γ = 0, δ = 0).  In the Cobb-Douglas case, optimal provincial budget shares 
depend solely on η-values (estimates of poverty incidence, in our illustration).  Even in this 
scenario, however, unchanging provincial shares mask large changes in provincial activities (E, 
S, S/P, N) as welfare weights, administrative costs and environmental protection costs change.  
When we relax the Cobb-Douglas assumptions, provincial shares change markedly as γ 
and δ shift over plausible ranges.  Table 6.1 provides an overview of the changes, by 
displaying correlations and rank correlations for different parameter values.  For Lao PDR, the 
result is a very large range of outcomes relative to the Cobb-Douglas scenario:  correlations 
between .99 and -.81.  
How should we proceed, in light of these disparate findings?  Should we adhere to single 
indicators, on the "common sense" grounds that administrators' willingness to substitute could 
not be too far from the Cobb-Douglas value?   In fact, we have no empirical support for this 
version of "common sense," nor do we know how much administrators' substitution parameters 
may vary across countries for political, social and institutional regions.  In any case, as we 
have seen, different poverty indicators provide very different signals for allocation policy in 
Lao PDR.  Since "common sense" offers little guidance, we offer the following conclusions 
and suggestions for further research.   
First, although the CES model introduces some complexity, we believe that it is less 
"academic" than simple indicators as a guide to priority-setting.  Sole reliance on the latter is   22
not really an application of "common sense."  Rather, it represents strong (Cobb-Douglas) 
restrictions on the substitution parameters in the CES model.  Relaxation of the Cobb-Douglas 
restrictions introduces a note of realism, because it allows other considerations to play a role in 
the decision process.  These include administrative costs, as well as political and institutional 
factors that affect administrators' willingness to substitute among objectives and regions.  In 
countries with strong regional rivalries, for example, administrators' willingness to substitute 
among provinces may be considerably less than the unit-elastic (Cobb-Douglas) value implied 
by the indicators-based approach.   
Second, we need to know a lot more about parameter values (objective value weights, 
substitution elasticities, and cost elasticities) under different country conditions.  Econometric 
estimation of such parameters seems both feasible and important for work on the poverty- 
environment nexus.   
Third, use of the model can lend valuable perspective, even when limited evidence is  
marshaled for case studies.  Consider, for example, the common practice of designating a few 
"high-priority" regions for resource allocation.  In light of column 4, Figure 5.1, we can see 
that this amounts to adopting very high values for γ and δ.  But common practice often reflects 
arbitrary cutoff criteria such as "top 5" status, while our results suggest that the number of 
"top" regions (2 in column 4, for example) may vary widely.  Logically, it is also inconsistent 
to assign "top" status using poverty indicators alone, since these reflect Cobb-Douglas 
assumptions that are explicitly violated by the cutoff procedure.  In our view, use of the 
optimizing approach can encourage more consistent selection of focal provinces in cases where 
administrators choose to adopt the "priority regions" approach.     23
Fourth, even when we have better evidence about administrators' tradeoffs, we will not 
be able to avoid a basic, normative question:  Whatever the current values of the decision 
parameters, are they the "right" values?  As we have seen, even our relatively simple model 
can generate a very broad range of outcomes for empirically-plausible changes in substitution 
elasticities.  We cannot escape the question, since any recommended allocation of resources 
will reflect implicit values of these parameters. 
On the other hand, we would not escape difficult questions, even if we adopted the Cobb-
Douglas restrictions and allocated provincial budgets via simple indicators.  As we have seen, 
the rank correlation of Laotian provincial shares based on poverty incidence and poverty count 
is effectively zero (.006).  Within the indicators framework, there is no clear criterion for 
choosing between the two allocations.  Broadening the framework to include other factors may 
offer a way out, and this is precisely what the CES approach offers.   
To illustrate the potential, we close by computing regional shares for two CES cases.  In 
each case, we assume high administrative cost elasticities and equal weights for program 
elasticities.  The first case assumes that administrators' willingness to substitute is high among 
objectives, but low among regions.  The second case assumes the converse.  We compute rank 
correlations for provincial shares when the η-values are, respectively, poverty incidence (PI) 
and the poverty count (PC).  For PI, provincial shares have a rank correlation of .98 between 
the high-low and low-high substitution scenarios.  For PC, the rank correlation is .99.  For 
mixed cases, (e.g., PI [γ high, δ low] vs. PC [γ low, δ high]), rank correlations for provincial 
shares are all in the range .50 - .60.  These results contrast strongly with zero rank correlation 
when PI and PC are used as simple indicators to guide provincial allocations.     24
These results provide a hopeful conclusion to our exercise for Lao PDR.  We have shown 
that simple poverty indicators do not provide consistent guidelines for policy, nor do they take 
account of differences in administrators' preferences and costs.  However, when different 
poverty indicators are embedded in an optimizing model that does incorporate preferences and 
costs, the resulting provincial allocations are very similar.  For Lao PDR, at least, movement 
toward optimization seems to promote harmonization of regional policy guidelines.     25
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Table 2.1  Ranked Provincial Budget Shares (Highest = 1) 
 





North Phongsaly  3  8 
North Luangnamtha  6  12 
North Oudomxay  2  5 
North Bokeo  9  14 
North Luangphrabang  10  4 
North Huaphanh  1  3 
North Xayabouri  17  13 
Center Vientiane  Municipality  18  10 
Center Xiengkhuang  11  9 
Center Vientiane  16  11 
Center Borikhamxay  15  16 
Center Khammuane  12  7 
Center Savannakhet  14  1 
Center Xaysomboon  4  18 
South Saravane  8  6 
South Sekong  5  17 
South Champasack  13  2 
South Attapeu  7  15 
 
 
Table 2.2:  Rank Correlations of Budget Shares  
         by Poverty Index 
 
 Incidence  Count  Gap 
Count 0.006     
Gap 0.203  0.959   
Severity 0.377  0.878  0.953 
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Table 4.1: Impact of Cost Elasticity (α) Change 
              on Poor People Served ('000) 
 
Region Province α1,α2 = 0 α1,α2 = -0.9  Ratio 
North Phongsaly  7.66  8.91  1.16 
North Luangnamtha  6.65  6.84  1.03 
North Oudomxay  8.85  22.43  2.53 
North Bokeo  5.28  4.51  0.85 
North Luangphrabang  5.28  5.36  1.01 
North Huaphanh  9.53  24.10  2.53 
North Xayabouri  2.53  0.67  0.26 
Center Vientiane Munic.  1.87  1.92  1.03 
Center Xiengkhuang  5.20  3.87  0.74 
Center Vientiane  3.05  1.40  0.46 
Center Borikhamxay  3.13  0.81  0.26 
Center Khammuane  5.20  4.88  0.94 
Center Savannakhet  4.72  6.54  1.39 
Center Xaysomboon  7.18  6.88  0.96 
South Saravane  5.58  8.86  1.59 
South Sekong  6.74  4.77  0.71 
South Champasack  4.99  8.21  1.64 
South Attapeu  6.56  4.92  0.75 
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Table 4.2:  Impact of Cost Elasticity (α) Change  
       on Provincial Ranking for Poor People Served 
 
   Province  Rank 
Region Province  α1,α2 = 0 α1,α2 = -0.9 
Rank 
Difference
North Phongsaly  3  3  0 
North Luangnamtha  6  7  1 
North Oudomxay  2  2  0 
North Bokeo  9  13  4 
North Luangphrabang  10  9  -1 
North Huaphanh  1  1  0 
North Xayabouri  17  18  1 
Center Vientiane  Municipality  18  15  -3 
Center Xiengkhuang  11  14  3 
Center Vientiane  16  16  0 
Center Borikhamxay  15  17  2 
Center Khammuane  11  11  0 
Center Savannakhet  14  8  -6 
Center Xaysomboon  4  6  2 
South Saravane  8  4  -4 
South Sekong  5  12  7 
South Champasack  13  5  -8 
South Attapeu  7  10  3 
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Table 4.3: Impact of Cost Elasticity (φ) Change on Environmental Improvement 
      
   Environmental 
Improvement    Province  
Rank 
Region            Province   φ = 0  φ = 0.9       Ratio    φ = 0  φ = 0.9 
Rank 
Difference
North Phongsaly  95.73  157.44  1.64  3  4  1 
North Luangnamtha  83.08  119.65  1.44  6  6  0 
North Oudomxay  110.61  108.32  0.98  2  7  5 
North Bokeo  65.99  75.68  1.15  9  9  0 
North Luangphrabang  65.99  63.71  0.97  10  11  1 
North Huaphanh  119.15  133.74  1.12  1  5  4 
North Xayabouri  31.63  31.12  0.98  17  16  -1 
Center Vientiane  Municipality  23.42  3.47  0.15  18  18  0 
Center Xiengkhuang  64.96  83.09  1.28  11  8  -3 
Center Vientiane  38.12  30.25  0.79  16  17  1 
Center Borikhamxay  39.15  57.66  1.47  15  12  -3 
Center Khammuane  64.96  65.93  1.01  11  10  -1 
Center Savannakhet  58.98  34.08  0.58  14  14  0 
Center Xaysomboon  89.75  159.63  1.78  4  2  -2 
South Saravane  69.75  47.53  0.68  8  13  5 
South Sekong  84.28  181.44  2.15  5  1  -4 
South Champasack  62.40  33.60  0.54  13  15  2 
South Attapeu  82.06  158.68  1.93  7  3  -4 
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Table 4.4: Environmental Improvement: Impact of Changing the Population Density Measure  
 
Cost 






Density %  Change 
Region Province  S  N  N  
North Phongsaly  8.91  157.44 63.65 -59.57 
North Luangnamtha  6.84  119.65 70.97 -40.69 
North Oudomxay  22.43  108.32 58.50 -45.99 
North Bokeo  4.51 75.68 47.03 -37.86 
North Luangphrabang  5.36 63.71 25.13 -60.55 
North Huaphanh  24.10  133.74 55.97 -58.15 
North Xayabouri  0.67 31.12 22.65 -27.23 
Center Vientiane  Municipality  1.92  3.47 14.49 317.53 
Center Xiengkhuang  3.87  83.09 43.88 -47.18 
Center Vientiane  1.40  30.25 34.33 13.49 
Center Borikhamxay  0.81  57.66 49.43 -14.27 
Center Khammuane  4.88  65.93 86.35 30.97 
Center Savannakhet  6.54  34.08 62.73 84.08 
Center Xaysomboon  6.88 159.63 229.13 43.54 
South Saravane  8.86 47.53 33.83 -28.83 
South Sekong  4.77  181.44 330.09 81.93 
South Champasack  8.21 33.60 44.31 31.87 
South Attapeu  4.92  158.68 95.85 -39.60   31
Table 5.1:  Regional Allocations Under Parametric Changes 
(a): Constant Administrative Costs 
γ   0  High 
δ   0  Low 
Cost   Constant  Constant 
 
% Changes 
Region  Province  S N S N S N 
North Phongsaly  7.66  95.73 8.84 51.33 15.5 -46.4 
North Luangnamtha  6.65  83.08 8.30 67.72 24.9 -18.5 
North Oudomxay  8.85 110.61  8.90  6.31 0.6 -94.3 
North Bokeo  5.28  65.99  5.97  137.39 13.2 108.2 
North Luangphrabang  5.28  65.99  5.90  139.80 11.7 111.9 
North Huaphanh  9.53 119.15  9.41  17.61 -1.3 -85.2 
North Xayabouri  2.53  31.63 0.43  272.67 -83.1 762.2 
Center Vientiane  Municipality 1.87  23.42 2.04  218.45 9.1 832.7 
Center Xiengkhuang  5.20  64.96 5.88  139.87 13.1 115.3 
Center Vientiane  3.05  38.12 0.71  270.81 -76.7 610.4 
Center Borikhamxay  3.13 39.15  5.77 125.67 84.3 221.0 
Center Khammuane  5.20  64.96  4.55  179.63 -12.5 176.5 
Center Savannakhet  4.72  58.98 1.94  250.94 -59.0 325.5 
Center Xaysomboon  7.18  89.75  9.05  35.38 26.1 -60.6 
South Saravane  5.58  69.75  5.35  158.39 -4.2 127.1 
South Sekong  6.74  84.28  8.74  49.54 29.7 -41.2 
South Champasack  4.99  62.40 4.29  185.72 -14.0 197.6 
South Attapeu  6.56  82.06 6.58  126.42 0.2 54.1 
(b) Variable Administrative Costs 
γ   0  High 
δ   0  Low 
Cost   High-Elasticity  High-Elasticity 
 
% Changes 
Region  Province  S N S  N  S N 
North Phongsaly  8.91 157.44 1.84  339.93  -79.3 115.9 
North Luangnamtha  6.84 119.65 1.47  343.07  -78.5 186.7 
North Oudomxay  22.43 108.32  12.35  0.00  -44.9 -100.0 
North Bokeo  4.51  75.68  0.80 350.65  -82.3 363.3 
North Luangphrabang  5.36  63.71  8.87 127.88  65.6 100.7 
North Huaphanh  24.10 133.74  13.70  0.01  -43.2 -100.0 
North Xayabouri  0.67  31.12 0.00  344.88  -100.0 1008.4 
Center Vientiane  Municipality 1.92 3.47  15.48 0.00 705.6 -100.0 
Center Xiengkhuang  3.87  83.09 0.07  380.81  -98.2 358.3 
Center Vientiane  1.40  30.25 0.00  343.63  -99.7 1036.0 
Center Borikhamxay  0.81  57.66 0.00  369.07  -100.0 540.1 
Center Khammuane  4.88  65.93  3.21  277.83  -34.2 321.4 
Center Savannakhet  6.54 34.08 18.01  0.37  175.6 -98.9 
Center  Xaysomboon  6.88 159.63  0.21 401.97  -96.9 151.8 
South  Saravane  8.86 47.53 16.12  0.10  81.9 -99.8 
South Sekong  4.77 181.44 0.00  418.53  -100.0 130.7 
South Champasack  8.21  33.60 16.60  0.01  102.2 -100.0 
South Attapeu  4.92 158.68  0.00 412.38  -100.0 159.9   32
Table 6.1:  Correlations of Provincial Shares Across 
         Parameter Changes 
 
(a)  Correlations with Cobb-Douglas allocation: 
      Constant Administrative Costs 
 
  Cobb-Douglas  γ Low , δ High γ High , δ Low
γ Low , δ High  0.27  
γ High , δ Low  -0.54 0.04 
γ High , δ High  0.73 0.39 -0.82
 
 
(b)  Correlations with Cobb-Douglas allocation: 
       High Administrative Cost Elasticity 
 
  Cobb-Douglas  γ Low , δ High γ High , δ Low
γ Low , δ High  -0.56  
γ High , δ Low  -0.81 0.52 
γ High , δ High  0.64 -0.23 -0.66
 
 
(c)  Rank Correlations with Cobb-Douglas allocation: 
      Constant Administrative Costs 
 
  Cobb-Douglas  γ Low , δ High γ High , δ Low
γ Low , δ High  0.05  
γ High , δ Low  -0.47 0.31 
γ High , δ High  0.99 0.04 -0.49
 
 
(d)  Rank Correlations with Cobb-Douglas allocation: 
      High Administrative Cost Elasticity 
 
  Cobb-Douglas  γ Low , δ High γ High , δ Low
γ Low , δ High  -0.62  
γ High , δ Low  -0.78 0.49 
γ High , δ High  0.96 -0.63 -0.87
   29


















































































































































































































   30


















Xiang Khoang  31



















Xiang Khoang  32
Figure 4.1:  Welfare Weights and Program Outcomes:  






















Figure 4.2:  Poor Persons Served: Cost Elasticities 
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Figure 4.3:  Environmental Improvement: Cost Elasticities 
           and Province Rankings 
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 Figure 5.1  Substitution Parameter Values and Provincial Allocations (%)  



























































































































































































































































































Figure 5.2  Substitution Parameter Values and Provincial Allocations (%) 
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